Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs

We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called {\em attainable} if player 1 can ensure that there is a finite horizon $T$ such that after time $T$ the distance between the set and the cumulative payoff is arbitrarily small, regardless of what strategy player 2 is using. This paper focuses on the case where the attainable set consists of one payoff vector. In this case the vector is called an attainable vector. We study properties of the set of attainable vectors, and characterize when a specific vector is attainable and when every vector is attainable.Comment: 28 pages, 2 figures, conference version at NetGCoop 201

Decomposition and Mean-Field Approach to Mixed Integer Optimal Compensation Problems

Mixed integer optimal compensation deals with optimization problems with integer- and real-valued control variables to compensate disturbances in dynamic systems. The mixed integer nature of controls could lead to intractability in problems of large dimensions. To address this challenge, we introduce a decomposition method which turns the original n-dimensional optimization problem into n independent scalar problems of lot sizing form. Each of these problems can be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game, which introduces some element of conservatism. Each scalar problem is then reformulated as a shortest path one and solved through linear programming over a receding horizon, a step that mirrors a standard procedure in mixed integer programming. We apply the decomposition method to a mean-field coupled multi-agent system problem, where each agent seeks to compensate a combination of an exogenous signal and the local state average. We discuss a large population mean-field type of approximation and extend our study to opinion dynamics in social networks as a special case of interest

Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks through Mean-Field Games

Emulation, mimicry, and herding behaviors are phenomena that are observed when multiple social groups interact. To study such phenomena, we consider in this paper a large population of homogeneous social networks. Each such network is characterized by a vector state, a vector-valued controlled input and a vector-valued exogenous disturbance. The controlled input of each network is to align its state to the mean distribution of other networks’ states in spite of the actions of the disturbance. One of the contributions of this paper is a detailed analysis of the resulting mean field game for the cases of both polytopic and L2 bounds on controls and disturbances. A second contribution is the establishment of a robust mean-field equilibrium, that is, a solution including the worst-case value function, the state feedback best-responses for the controlled inputs and worst-case disturbances, and a density evolution. This solution is characterized by the property that no player can benefit from a unilateral deviation even in the presence of the disturbance. As a third contribution, microscopic and macroscopic analyses are carried out to show convergence properties of the population distribution using stochastic stability theory

N -Person Dynamic Stackelberg Difference Games with Open-Loop Information Pattern

Abstract. In this paper, extensions are presented for the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution of n-person discrete-time affine-quadratic dynamic games of prespecified fixed duration, concerning the number of followers and the possibility of an algorithmic disintegration. The given results extend the current state of research which is defined by the results for one leader and one follower that are given in T. Başar and G. Olsde

Computational Markets to Regulate Mobile-Agent Systems

Mobile-agent systems allow applications to distribute their resource consumption across the network. By prioritizing applications and publishing the cost of actions, it is possible for applications to achieve faster performance than in an environment where resources are evenly shared. We enforce the costs of actions through markets where user applications bid for computation from host machines. \par We represent applications as collections of mobile agents and introduce a distributed mechanism for allocating general computational priority to mobile agents. We derive a bidding strategy for an agent that plans expenditures given a budget and a series of tasks to complete. We also show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists between the agents under our allocation policy. We present simulation results to show that the use of our resource-allocation mechanism and expenditure-planning algorithm results in shorter mean job completion times compared to traditional mobile-agent resource allocation. We also observe that our resource-allocation policy adapts favorably to allocate overloaded resources to higher priority agents, and that agents are able to effectively plan expenditures even when faced with network delay and job-size estimation error

Team-optimal distributed MMSE estimation in general and tree networks

We construct team-optimal estimation algorithms over distributed networks for state estimation in the finite-horizon mean-square error (MSE) sense. Here, we have a distributed collection of agents with processing and cooperation capabilities. These agents observe noisy samples of a desired state through a linear model and seek to learn this state by interacting with each other. Although this problem has attracted significant attention and been studied extensively in fields including machine learning and signal processing, all the well-known strategies do not achieve team-optimal learning performance in the finite-horizon MSE sense. To this end, we formulate the finite-horizon distributed minimum MSE (MMSE) when there is no restriction on the size of the disclosed information, i.e., oracle performance, over an arbitrary network topology. Subsequently, we show that exchange of local estimates is sufficient to achieve the oracle performance only over certain network topologies. By inspecting these network structures, we propose recursive algorithms achieving the oracle performance through the disclosure of local estimates. For practical implementations we also provide approaches to reduce the complexity of the algorithms through the time-windowing of the observations. Finally, in the numerical examples, we demonstrate the superior performance of the introduced algorithms in the finite-horizon MSE sense due to optimal estimation. © 2017 Elsevier Inc

Dependence of Avidity on Linker Length for a Bivalent Ligand–Bivalent Receptor Model System

This paper describes a synthetic dimer of carbonic anhydrase, and a series of bivalent sulfonamide ligands with different lengths (25 to 69 Å between the ends of the fully extended ligands), as a model system to use in examining the binding of bivalent antibodies to antigens. Assays based on analytical ultracentrifugation and fluorescence binding indicate that this system forms cyclic, noncovalent complexes with a stoichiometry of one bivalent ligand to one dimer. This dimer binds the series of bivalent ligands with low picomolar avidities (Kdavidity = 3–40 pM). A structurally analogous monovalent ligand binds to one active site of the dimer with Kdmono = 16 nM. The bivalent association is thus significantly stronger (Kdmono/Kdavidity ranging from 500 to 5000 unitless) than the monovalent association. We infer from these results, and by comparison of these results to previous studies, that bivalency in antibodies can lead to associations much tighter than monovalent associations (although the observed bivalent association is much weaker than predicted from the simplest level of theory: predicted Kdavidity of 0.002 pM and Kdmono/Kdavidity 8 × 106 unitless).Chemistry and Chemical Biolog

Stochastic subgradient algorithms for strongly convex optimization over distributed networks

We study diffusion and consensus based optimization of a sum of unknown convex objective functions over distributed networks. The only access to these functions is through stochastic gradient oracles, each of which is only available at a different node; and a limited number of gradient oracle calls is allowed at each node. In this framework, we introduce a convex optimization algorithm based on stochastic subgradient descent (SSD) updates. We use a carefully designed time-dependent weighted averaging of the SSD iterates, which yields a convergence rate of O N ffiffiffi N p (1s)T after T gradient updates for each node on a network of N nodes, where 0 ≤ σ < 1 denotes the second largest singular value of the communication matrix. This rate of convergence matches the performance lower bound up to constant terms. Similar to the SSD algorithm, the computational complexity of the proposed algorithm also scales linearly with the dimensionality of the data. Furthermore, the communication load of the proposed method is the same as the communication load of the SSD algorithm. Thus, the proposed algorithm is highly efficient in terms of complexity and communication load. We illustrate the merits of the algorithm with respect to the state-of-art methods over benchmark real life data sets. © 2017 IEEE

Separable and Low-Rank Continuous Games

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in separable games. We show that these games admit finitely supported Nash equilibria. Motivated by the bounds on the supports of mixed equilibria in two-player finite games in terms of the ranks of the payoff matrices, we define the notion of the rank of an n-player continuous game and use this to provide bounds on the cardinality of the support of equilibrium strategies. We present a general characterization theorem that states that a continuous game has finite rank if and only if it is separable. Using our rank results, we present an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria of two-player separable games with fixed strategy spaces in time polynomial in the rank of the game